



Directorate of  
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
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# Afghanistan Situation Report

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25 June 1985



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<b>NEW FRENCH PLANS FOR AFGHAN AID</b> <div data-bbox="852 722 928 774"></div>	1	
The French Government may eliminate medical and food aid to the Afghan resistance because of political and economic reasons. <div data-bbox="672 856 750 907"></div>		25X1
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<b>ISMAILIS DEFECTING TO THE RESISTANCE</b> <div data-bbox="946 947 1015 1001"></div>	2	
The leader of a proregime Afghan Shia group has requested help from the resistance to get to Pakistan. <div data-bbox="526 1079 599 1125"></div>		25X1
<b>IN BRIEF</b>	2	
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<b>ALTERNATIVES TO BABRAK</b> <div data-bbox="678 1264 750 1316"></div>	3	
Rumors that President Babrak Karmal will be replaced have recently increased. There is, however, no clear alternative to Babrak within the Afghan leadership. Leadership options--in decreasing order of likelihood--include replacing Babrak with a member of his Parcham faction, a member of the rival Khalq faction, or a coalition government headed by a relative unknown. <div data-bbox="311 1549 380 1602"></div> <div data-bbox="1308 1522 1386 1572"></div>		25X1
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This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues raised in the publication should be directed to <div data-bbox="639 1774 1419 1845"></div>		25X1
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The Soviets are probably aware that, at best, only marginal improvement would result from installing one of these men. Most Afghans would regard them as Soviet puppets. They are less objectionable than Babrak only because they so far have not dealt with many of the issues that face a president. The odds are against anyone accomplishing much through the inefficient and often secretly disloyal Afghan civil service. Moreover, no one is likely to be able to reconcile the bitter differences between the Khalqis and Parchamis in the next several years. [REDACTED]

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#### If the Party is Replaced by a Coalition

The Soviets might form a coalition government either as part of a peace settlement or to try to win over part of the resistance. Such a government would lack credibility if headed by a Communist, so Moscow would presumably try to install a non-Communist who believed that Kabul must have good relations with Moscow. Rumors in Kabul and among Afghans abroad about such a candidate have included former Prime Minister Yusuf, former King Zahir Shah, and his son-in-law Prince Abdul Wali. Because these figures represent the pre-Marxist era and because they are closely associated with the West, they would probably be unacceptable both to the

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NAME	POST	FACTION	AGE	COMMENT
Mohammad Zahir Shah	*	*	70	King (1933-73), living in exile in Rome, possible unifying figure for resistance or compromise government.
Abdul Wali	*	*	61	Prince, first cousin and son-in-law of King, influential with King, unpopular with many Afghans.
Abdul Sattar Shalizi	*	*	69	Former Deputy Prime Minister, former Interior Minister, studied in United States, lived in Afghanistan 1981-82, after six years in United States.

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